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Reason, Reasons, and Reasoning: 
A Constructivist Account of Human Rationality 
David Moshman 
University Of Nebraska–Lincoln 
Abstract
The concept of rationality has its roots in a historic philosophical concep-
tion of human beings as creatures of reason. To act on the basis of reason is 
to act on the basis of reasons, which in turn implies a process of reasoning. 
An objectivist conception of rationality sees its essence as lying in the use of 
reasoning processes that conform to appropriate logical norms. A subjectiv-
ist conception of rationality sees its essence in the subjective appeal to rea-
sons. It is argued that neither approach alone is adequate. Rationality is best 
viewed as metasubjective objectivity. That is, the standards that embody ra-
tionality’s objective component are not externally imposed rules that cir-
cumvent subjectivity. Rather, they are internally constructed via active re-
fl ection on one’s subjectivity. Psychological evidence on the development 
of metasubjectivity is interpreted as consistent with the present approach. 
Implications for theory and research, and for educational and psychothera-
peutic practice, are discussed.
For Plato, it was a question of personhood. Rationality was what distin-
guished people—creatures of reason—from all else in the universe. 
What does it mean to be a creature of reason? At the very least, it means 
that one’s thoughts and actions are not entirely random, arbitrary, refl exive, 
or conditioned. To the extent that reason rules, one’s beliefs and behavior are 
not innately fi xed, nor are they completely molded by experience, nor are they 
mechanically caused by some interaction of genetic and environmental fac-
tors. The beliefs and behavior of a rational agent must be explained, at least in 
part, on the basis of why it has chosen to believe and do what it believes and 
does. To be a creature of reason, in other words, is to think and act on the ba-
sis of reasons (Rescher, 1988; Siegel, 1988). 
But to generate and apply reasons is to engage in a process of reasoning. 
Moreover, if my reasoning is inadequate, it may turn out that what I take to be 
reasons for my beliefs and behavior actually do not justify what I think and 
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do, An objectivist conception of rationality would stress that unless my rea-
sons are good reasons—that is, unless they provide genuine justifi cation—my 
appeal to them does not make me rational. Thus it is not enough, in the ob-
jectivist conception, that I have and act on the basis of (what I take to be) rea-
sons. It is necessary to examine my reasoning and determine whether it con-
forms to objectively defensible norms of good reasoning. 
In what follows I suggest that an objectivist conception of rationality un-
derlies most psychological research and theory on human reasoning. I then 
propose an alternative subjectivist account and ultimately integrate the two 
perspectives to produce a view of rationality as a form of objectivity con-
structed via metacognitive refl ection on, and developmental reconstruction 
of, one’s subjectivity. The remainder of the paper then considers some rele-
vant research and explores implications of the proposed view of rationality as 
metasubjective objectivity. 
Rationality as Conformity to Objective Rules of Reasoning 
In the hands of Aristotle, interest in human reason was transformed into 
a focus on human reasoning, which in turn was seen as a matter of formal de-
ductive logic. Over the course of many centuries of elaboration and systemati-
zation, it was assumed that the study of logic was simultaneously the study of 
how people reason and of how they should reason. As late as the 19th century, 
the laws of logic were still taken to be the laws of thought (Boole, 1854). 
With the rise of scientifi c psychology in the late 19th century, however, 
both psychologists and philosophers increasingly distinguished questions of 
what people do (the province of psychology) from questions of what they 
ought to do (the province of philosophy). From this perspective, then, philo-
sophical logic is properly concerned with ideal rationality, the objectively jus-
tifi able logical norms to which the reasoning of an ideal rational being must 
conform. Whether and to what extent the actual reasoning of real people con-
formed to such norms was strictly irrelevant. Correspondingly, the role of psy-
chologists was to study actual reasoning. 
Psychologists have indeed studied reasoning for most of the present cen-
tury. Central to this endeavor has been a long-standing tradition of research 
on deductive reasoning (Rips, 1990). In addition, the past several decades 
have seen an explosion of research on various sorts of informal, scientifi c, and 
probabilistic reasoning (e.g. Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Loughlin, 1988; 
Voss, Perkins, & Segal, 1991). Sharply distinguishing such work from philos-
ophy, some psychologists have argued that “the task of psychologists is to un-
derstand the nature of inferential behaviour rather than to judge it as rational 
or irrational” (Evans, 1984, p. 462). It has even been suggested that psycholo-
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gists should put to rest “the unfalsifi able and value-laden notion of irrational-
ity” (Lanning, 1987, p. 116). 
The differentiation of psychological from philosophical concerns about 
reasoning, however, leaves open important questions about the adequacy of 
human reasoning and the possibility of improving it. Philosophy alone, were 
it to exclude all question of how people really think, could have nothing to say 
about actual human reasoning. Psychology alone, were it to eschew consid-
eration of normative standards, could not evaluate the reasoning processes it 
discovered, much less justify any intervention to change them. 
Fortunately, many philosophers interested in rationality have shown con-
siderable interest in actual reasoning. Correspondingly, most psychological 
research on reasoning directly considers the relation of subjects’ reasoning to 
independent normative standards—formal logic, laws of probability, princi-
ples of reasoning and so forth (Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn et al., 1988; Markovits & 
Vachon, 1989; Moshman & Franks, 1986; Overton, 1990; Rips, 1990; Ward 
& Overton, 1990). In fact, many psychologists have directly addressed the im-
plications of reasoning research for general questions about human rationality 
(Evans, 1989, 1991; Lopes, 1991) and many philosophers have joined whole-
heartedly in the vigorous and continuing controversy over these issues (Stich, 
1990). There thus exists a substantial literature that, without collapsing the 
important conceptual distinction between empirical and normative endeavors, 
attempts to address issues of human rationality by comparing empirically es-
tablished processes of reasoning to relevant normative standards. 
Such work is not suffi cient to establish a comprehensive account of hu-
man rationality, however. Looking back beyond Aristotle to Plato, we must 
question the underlying assumption that rationality is simply a matter of con-
formity to objective rules of reasoning. 
Rationality as a Subjective Appeal to Reasons 
Imagine a rock rolling down a hill. How do we explain events of this sort? 
Typically we would appeal to specifi c external infl uences on the rock, such as 
its being pushed by a person and/or pulled by gravity. We would not suggest 
that the rock is attempting to achieve some goal. We would explain the move-
ment of the rock on the basis of causal infl uences on the rock, not on the basis 
of the rock’s reasons for doing what it does. 
It is important to note that the rock’s motions are not completely arbi-
trary, random or unpredictable. On the contrary, they conform precisely to 
the “laws” of physics. But this conformity to rigorous laws is not enough 
to justify an attribution of rationality. The rock has no purpose, nor even a 
point of view. There may be “reasons” for the rock’s movement in the sense 
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that an observer can explain its motion on the basis of physical causality, but 
the rock itself, having no subjective perspective, has no reasons, and thus no 
rationality. 
Imagine now a computer programmed to process propositions in such a 
way as to derive new propositions from them. Suppose the programmed pro-
cesses correspond precisely to logical norms such that the output from the 
computer always follows logically from the input. The computer cannot ap-
ply any inferential process that is not absolutely in conformity with appropri-
ate nonnative standards. It has never reached—and will never reach—an un-
justifi ed conclusion. 
How do we explain the computer’s activities? At a purely physical level, 
we might conceivably provide a causal explanation just as we did in the case 
of the rock. Given the input, and given the physical state of the programmed 
computer, the laws of physics yield a sequence of events culminating in com-
pletely predictable output. There is no reason here for suggesting that the com-
puter is any more rational than the rock. 
At a more cognitive level of analysis, we might distinguish the computer’s 
program from its hardware. Without denying that computers, like all physical 
entities, act in accord with the laws of physics, we might explain the comput-
er’s transformation of its input to its output on the basis of the processes it is 
programmed to perform. We might then suggest that there are good reasons 
for the computer’s output, given that the output was generated from the input 
via logical processes. 
But the computer, unless it has attained some level of genuine self- re-
fl ection, does not know it has reasons for its conclusions, or even that it has 
reached conclusions. It is simply generating output from input in accord with 
its program. It is only the programmer who knows that the programmed pro-
cesses conform to logical standards and thus lead to justifi able conclusions. 
The computer does not even have beliefs, much less reasons for those beliefs. 
The beliefs and reasons are in the mind of the programmer. Lacking intention 
and perspective, the computer cannot be said to have reasons and thus cannot 
be considered a rational agent (Lehrer, 1990). 
Consider now the following account of an 8-month-old baby: 
Laurent . . . uses my hand as an intermediate to make me resume the ac-
tivities which interest him. For example, I tap my cheek with my left mid-
dle fi nger, then I drum on my eyeglasses (he laughs). Afterward I put my 
hand halfway between his eyes and my face. He looks at my glasses, then 
at my hands, and ends by gently pushing my hand toward my face. (Piaget, 
1963, p. 224) 
Why did Laurent push Piaget’s hand? Apparently, because he wanted 
Piaget to resume his amusing behavior. Of course, a complete psychological 
account would need to go further than this. It is enough for our purposes, how-
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ever, to note that Laurent is a purposeful, subjective agent, intentionally ini-
tiating an action in order to achieve his objectives. This is not to deny that a 
baby is a physical object with a genetic and environmental history. Its behav-
ior is no doubt consistent with any applicable “laws” of physics, biology, and 
psychology. But Laurent nevertheless has one of the key characteristics of a 
rational agent, a characteristic that was lacking in the rock and the computer: 
he has reasons for what he does. 
It would be too quick, however, to conclude that babies are rational and 
computers are not. The conformity of the above-discussed computer to objec-
tively defensible norms does suggest an aspect of rationality that a computer 
(without knowing it) may have and that a baby (notwithstanding its conscious 
desires and purposeful actions) may lack. We are, I think, rightly hesitant to 
attribute full rationality to either. The key point is that the concept of rational-
ity, in its historic and typical uses, seems to include both subjective and ob-
jective elements (Bickhard, 1991). Rationality involves having a subjective 
perspective, including intentions and reasons, and acting in accord with ob-
jectively defensible norms, including logic. 
The inadequacy of the objectivist and subjectivist conceptions of rational-
ity suggests the need for an alternative. One might wonder whether we need 
a concept of rationality at all. But to deny rationality would be to claim that 
we never really have reason for believing anything. On pain of self-contradic-
tion, one cannot maintain that there is adequate reason for such a claim. We 
may therefore assume the existence of rationality and seek a more adequate 
account of its nature. 
Rationality as Metasubjective Objectivity 
I have presented two conceptions of rationality, respectively labeled “ob-
jectivist” and “subjectivist,” and argued that neither is adequate to capture our 
intuitive sense of what it means to be a rational agent. Rather than dispense 
with the concept of rationality, however, I propose that we can defi ne it in a 
way that not only is meaningful but also will assist us in conceptualizing the 
relationship of objectivity and subjectivity. In the present section, I develop 
and examine a conception of rationality as a form of objectivity that emerges 
from a refl ective reconstruction of one’s subjectivity. 
Subjectivity, Objectivity and Rationality 
There is a natural inclination to construe subjectivity as a realm of idio-
syncratic perceptions, feelings, interpretations and commitments that need not 
and cannot be justifi ed. Correspondingly, objectivity is viewed as the realm of 
facts, logic and rigorous justifi cation. Given such conceptions, it is natural to 
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see a fundamental opposition between subjectivity and objectivity and to as-
sociate rationality with the latter (Moshman & Lukin, 1989).
 
But subjectivity need not be construed as a realm of idiosyncratic ideas 
and feelings. Rather, it may be seen as a property of cognitive actions (reason-
ing, remembering, perceiving, etc.) that take place, as they must, from some 
point of view (Nagel, 1986). Objectivity, on this view, is not a realm of ab-
solute truth and rigorous logic distinct from the realm of subjectivity. Rather, 
subjectivity and objectivity are complementary poles of the relationship of 
knowing (Piaget, 1985). Given that knowing always takes place from some 
point of view, one’s knowledge is always a function of one’s viewpoint and 
thus unavoidably subjective. To the extent that knowledge is constrained by a 
reality distinct from the knower, however, it is also a function of that reality 
and thus, to that extent, objective. 
When I see the Star Trek mug on my desk, for example, my seeing is sub-
jective in that what I perceive is a function of my sensory organs, my concept 
of a “mug,” my knowledge of Star Trek, etc. My perception is simultaneously 
objective, however, to the extent that what I perceive (a Star Trek mug rather 
than, say, an armadillo) is a function of a reality distinct from my perspective. 
Knowing, in other words, is a joint function of perspective and reality, and 
thus simultaneously subjective and objective. 
Can I increase my objectivity? To the extent that I become aware of the 
various ways my perspective determines what I see, I can compensate for that 
and form a more objective conception of what is really there. Recognizing 
that my perception is infl uenced by my cognitive structures, for example, I 
may conclude that what is really on my mug is a set of colored patterns; I in-
terpret them as a Star Trek scenario in part because of (what I now see as) the 
specifi c confi guration of colors and patterns but also (I now realize) because 
of the salience of Star Trek in my cognitorium. Thus my knowledge about my 
subjective perspective enables me to understand why I see what I see the way 
I do and to construct a more objective conception of what is really there. 
But are there really colored patterns on my mug? Further analysis may 
lead me to determine that what is really there is a confi guration of atoms that 
refl ect light waves in such a way as to cause my visual system to register cer-
tain colors and patterns. But even this more objective conception refl ects the 
theories I am using to comprehend my relationship with reality; those theo-
ries, however well supported, are subjective perspectives themselves. Thus 
my continuing self-refl ections never permit me to transcend subjectivity but 
nevertheless may allow increasing objectivity (Piaget, 1985). If we defi ne the 
refl ective analysis and reconstruction of one’s subjectivity as metasubjectivity, 
we can then defi ne rationality as metasubjective objectivity. 
It is important to emphasize that psychological refl ection takes place in 
the course of transactions with one’s environment. From an external point of 
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view, the object of refl ection is not pure subjectivity but a subject-object (or 
subject-subject) relationship. The construction of that “external” (metasubjec-
tive) point of view enables explicit understanding and reconstruction of the 
previously implicit subject-object relationship. My (metasubjective) knowl-
edge about my visual system, for example, enables me better to understand 
the nature of the environment that interacts with that system to yield the expe-
rience of a Star Trek scenario. 
Thus refl ection on the subject is simultaneously the construction of the ob-
ject (Piaget, 1985). Rationality—the co-construction of metasubjectivity and 
objectivity—is intrinsic to the process of refl ection. As Thomas Nagel put it: 
To acquire a more objective understanding of some aspect of life or the 
world, we step back from our initial view of it and form a new concep-
tion which has that new and its relation to the world as its object. In other 
words, we place ourselves in the world that is to be understood. The old 
view then comes to be regarded as an appearance, more subjective than the 
new new, and correctable or confi rmable by reference to it. The process 
can be repeated, yielding a still more objective conception. (1986, p. 4) 
The Development of Metasubjective Objectivity 
An important implication of the present conception is that rationality 
can only be understood developmentally. That is, no set of ideas or system of 
logic can be taken as defi ning rationality (Bickhard, 1991). We are rational 
to the extent that our most fundamental conceptions and modes of reason-
ing enable greater objectivity than did their predecessors. Rationality resides 
in the developmental process whereby our subjectivity becomes an object of 
refl ection, thereby allowing the construction of a more objective metasubjec-
tivity. Specifi c facts and rules may be learned, but rationality is an intrinsi-
cally developmental phenomenon (Beilin, 1992; Bickhard, 1991; Campbell 
& Bickhard, 1986; Moshman & Lukin, 1989). As Nagel put it: 
We can add to our knowledge of the world by accumulating information at 
a given level—by extensive observation from one standpoint. But we can 
raise our understanding to a new level only if we examine that relation be-
tween the world and ourselves which is responsible for our prior under-
standing, and form a new conception that includes a more detached under-
standing of ourselves, of the world, and of the interaction between them. 
(1986, p. 5) 
Why do we engage in such metasubjective refl ection? The inherent sub-
jectivity of knowing insures that people will frequently disagree with each 
other’s perceptions, interpretations and conclusions. Moreover, the multiple 
perspectives a given individual can bring to bear on a complex situation rou-
tinely create internal contradictions as well. Such disputes and discrepancies 
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can only be accounted for and addressed by becoming aware of the differ-
ences in perspective that generate them. Thus disequilibrium provides the mo-
tivation for metasubjective refl ection (Piaget, 1985). 
One may still wonder why such refl ection enhances objectivity. Refl ec-
tion on and reconstruction of one’s subjectivity is, after all, a subjective pro-
cess—that is, it takes place from the subject’s point of view. It may allow one 
to transcend a particular subjective perspective but it does not allow one to 
escape subjectivity per se and move into a distinct realm of objectivity. One 
might, then, expect metasubjectivity to lead toward increasing idiosyncrasy 
and ever further from any sort of objectivity. 
Metasubjective refl ection may indeed create confusion, uncertainty and 
emotional trauma (Chandler, Boyes, & Ball, 1990). In making implicit as-
pects of our knowing explicit, however, it has the potential to generate a re-
constructed subjectivity that encompasses and transcends the lower-order 
perspective on which it refl ects (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986). The better I 
understand my own contribution to a given epistemic transaction, the better 
my inference about the contribution of reality and the greater my ability to re-
construct my subjectivity so as to be less distorting of what I now take reality 
(including myself) to be. 
To the extent that the resulting metasubjectivity represents an increase in 
objectivity, it may resolve the disequilibrium that originally motivated self-
refl ection (Piaget, 1985). More objective metasubjectivities are thereby more 
likely than others to persist and, eventually, become a fundamental part of the 
individual (Bickhard, 1991). To the extent that they do, it is because their su-
periority to what they replace is recognized by the individual. Thus their nor-
mative status corresponds to their motivational force. 
Development of Metasubjective Objectivity: Empirical Evidence 
Having proposed and discussed a conception of rationality as metasubjec-
tive objectivity, I now turn to the relation of this conception to empirical re-
search. I fi rst consider evidence relating to the prevalence and developmen-
tal course of metasubjectivity and then turn to the more complex question of 
whether objectivity emerges via metasubjectivity. 
Development of Metasubjectivity 
On the basis of the present perspective, one would expect metasubjec-
tivity to be characteristic of human cognition and to show a robust devel-
opmental course. Available data are fully consistent with these expectations. 
Research spanning a variety of topics, methodologies and theoretical perspec-
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tives shows substantial metasubjectivity in children as well as adults and dra-
matic developmental progress toward qualitatively greater awareness of one’s 
knowledge, perspectives and inferential processes. 
Such development begins very early. Even during the preschool years, 
children show increasing awareness of their own subjectivity and increasing 
understanding of the role of subjectivity in perception, knowledge and rea-
soning (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1990; 
Moshman, 1990a; Pillow, 1988). This is revealed, for example, in children’s 
increasing ability to identify the sources of their beliefs (O’Neill & Gopnik, 
1991), to recognize the possibility of generating knowledge via inference (So-
dian & Wimmer, 1987), to appreciate the infl uence of prior knowledge on be-
lief (Perner & Davies, 1991), and to distinguish their own perspectives from 
those of others and from reality itself (Flavell, 1992). 
The development of metasubjectivity continues for many more years. 
Much of later development involves increasingly explicit conceptions about 
the nature and use of theories, logic, and reasoning. As children move into and 
through adolescence, for example, most increasingly understand the distinc-
tion between hypotheses and evidence (Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn et al., 1988), the 
non-empirical nature of tautologies and contradictions (Osherson & Mark-
man, 1975; Russell & Haworth, 1987), and the validity of arguments as dis-
tinct from the empirical truth of their component propositions (Moshman & 
Franks, 1986). Over the course of adolescence and adulthood, many individu-
als show increasingly sophisticated and explicit conceptions regarding the na-
ture and justifi cation of knowledge (Chandler et al., 1990; Kitchener, King, 
Wood, & Davison, 1989; Kuhn, 1991, chap. 7). Although questions remain 
regarding the nature of various metasubjective competencies and the ages 
at which they typically develop (Chandler et al., 1990; Sodian, Zaitchik, & 
Carey, 1991), the existence of a strong developmental trend toward increasing 
metasubjectivity is not seriously disputed, 
Metasubjectivity and Objectivity 
The more diffi cult question is whether and how metasubjectivity contrib-
utes to objectivity and whether the development of metasubjectivity is thereby 
central to the development of rationality. With respect to preschool children, 
initial ability to distinguish objective reality from mere appearance occurs about 
the same time as ability to understand the subjective basis for appearances and 
is widely assumed to be closely associated with such metasubjectivity (Asting-
ton et al., 1988; Flavell, 1992). Whether further development of metasubjectiv-
ity entails increasingly objective reasoning, however, is less clear. 
With respect to metatheoretical awareness, for example, does refl ection 
on the distinction between theories and evidence yield the sort of hypothesis-
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testing strategies that provide a more objective view of reality? There is in-
deed evidence for a developmental progression from testing hypotheses by 
seeking supporting evidence to testing them by systematically seeking discon-
fi rming evidence (Overton, 1990; Ward & Overton, 1990). The latter strategy 
represents a gain in objectivity in that it is more likely to show the falsity of a 
hypothesis (given that it is indeed false). The age range of this developmental 
trend corresponds roughly to the age range in which metatheoretical aware-
ness is developing (Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn et al., 1988). 
Similarly, coordinating developmental trends across studies, one can 
make a case that greater awareness of one’s deductive processes yields in-
creasingly consistent logical reasoning. The increasing metalogical aware-
ness of argument form over the course of adolescence (Moshman & Franks, 
1986), for example, may be associated with increasing ability to reason ob-
jectively with contrary-to-fact propositions (Markovits & Vachon, 1989). 
Although even young children often make correct inferences, the devel-
opmental trend toward systematic deductive reasoning is plausibly under-
stood as emerging from successive levels of metalogical refl ection (Mosh-
man, 1990a). 
These data do admit of alternative interpretations, however. More con-
vincing support for the present view might come from studies in which the 
same individuals are assessed with respect to both metasubjectivity and objec-
tive reasoning. Such research is unfortunately rare. There is, however, a recent 
study by Kuhn (1991) in which 160 adolescents and adults were assessed with 
respect to (a) their conceptions about the nature of knowledge and (b) various 
aspects of skill in argumentation. Consistent with the present account, those 
individuals with the most sophisticated conceptions about the justifi ability of 
knowledge—who saw theories as uncertain and yet subject to rational eval-
uation—were more likely than the others to be able to provide counterargu-
ments with respect to their theories and to generate alternative theories (Kuhn, 
1991, chap. 7). Even this evidence, however, does not show that the more ob-
jective reasoning resulted from construction of the higher level of metasubjec-
tive awareness. 
Conclusion 
Available evidence thus shows strong developmental trends with respect 
to many varieties of metasubjectivity. Direct evidence that such metasubjec-
tivity contributes to objectivity is sparse. It seems unlikely, however, that 
metasubjectivity would be so pervasive and develop so vigorously if it served 
no purpose. This suggests the need for further research more directly examin-
ing metasubjectivity as a basis for objectivity. 
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Implications and Conclusions 
I have argued for a constructivist conception of rationality. Rationality, 
in this conception, is in part an objective matter involving the conformity of 
reasoning to philosophically defensible standards. Rationality is also, in part, 
a subjective matter involving purposeful action on the basis of personal rea-
sons. Psychological evidence shows that refl ection on one’s subjectivity is a 
normal aspect of human cognition and development beginning in early child-
hood. Refl ection on subjectivity is itself a subjective process, but this does not 
mean that it moves the individual further from the constraints of rules and re-
ality. On the contrary, metasubjectivity may involve systematic reconstruction 
of reasoning so as to better coordinate subjectivity and objectivity. The result-
ing developmental progression toward metasubjective objectivity, it is sug-
gested, constitutes rationality. This conception of human reason has important 
implications for theory, research and practice. 
Theoretical Implications 
Any general theory of cognition must explicate human rationality. To do 
so, it must be able to address both subjective and objective considerations in a 
way that makes it possible to relate these (Bickhard, 1991; Campbell & Bick-
hard, 1986; Moshman & Lukin, 1989). 
Piaget’s theory in its traditional versions (e.g. as presented in Flavell, 
1963) proposed a succession of developmental stages, each characterized by 
a distinct logical structure demonstrably more adequate than the structure of 
the previous stage. If one construes rationality in purely objective terms, such 
a theory can be taken to posit progressive levels of rationality. 
In his later work, however, Piaget increasingly emphasized the devel-
opmental role of refl ective abstraction, involving an active process of meta-
cognitive refl ection on and reconstruction of one’s knowing from the emerg-
ing perspective of a higher level of knowing (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986). 
Moreover, Piaget viewed development as an ongoing renegotiation of the re-
lation between subjectivity and objectivity, with objectivity constructed via a 
process of metasubjective refl ection (Piaget, 1985). The present account, then, 
without being committed to the specifi cs of Piaget’s stages, is clearly Piage-
tian in a broad sense. It suggests that Piaget’s later work is fundamental to 
the study of human reasoning and rationality—arguably a new theory (Bei-
lin, 1992). 
Information-processing theories generally emphasize the precise specifi -
cation and modeling of real-time unconscious mental processes. To the extent 
that such processes correspond to logical standards, they may be rational in a 
purely objective sense. With respect to the present conception of rationality, 
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however, persons using such processes to manipulate mental representations 
are no more rational than computers engaged in comparable processing. The 
increasing focus of information-processing theorists on metacognitive and ex-
ecutive processes represents a step in the right direction. To the extent that 
metacognition merely illuminates, monitors or directs cognitive processes 
without actively transforming them, however, it is a much weaker mechanism 
than Piaget’s refl ective abstraction. 
What information-processing theories need in order to fully address is-
sues of human rationality, in my view, are stronger mechanisms of self-re-
fl ection capable of transforming understanding (Moshman, in press; for an 
attempt to provide such a mechanism, see Klahr, 1984). Only with such 
mechanisms will information-processing theories be able to account for the 
sort of metasubjectivity that research reviewed earlier has shown to develop 
and that the present theory posits as central to rationality. The same can be 
said with respect to neo-Piagetian theories of the sort discussed in Case 
(1992). 
Implications for Research 
Rationality is generally not seen as a distinct topic for psychological re-
search. The literature typically deemed most relevant to rationality is the 
work on reasoning. But the application of the reasoning literature to issues 
of rationality typically consists of comparing actual reasoning processes 
with logical norms, an approach that only gets at the objective aspect of 
rationality. 
There are, happily, a substantial number of studies concerning the devel-
opment of conceptions about mind, perception, representation, knowledge, 
logic, reasoning and so forth. Such work appears to be yielding an increas-
ingly cohesive literature on the emergence of metasubjectivity. That literature 
may be at least as important as the reasoning literature to understanding hu-
man rationality. 
What is still lacking is an integration of these two literatures. Research on 
rationality must address more directly the relation of metasubjectivity to ob-
jective reasoning. Such research, especially at higher levels of development, 
will be complicated by the fact that the standard of objectivity is itself a func-
tion of the scientist’s perspective, and thus a matter of legitimate dispute. Nev-
ertheless, an integrated program of research on metasubjectivity and reason-
ing may help address fundamental questions raised earlier about the relation 
of objectivity to metasubjectivity, about the emergence of higher logics from 
higher levels of refl ection. Such an integration might eventually yield a sys-
tematic body of psychological research on human rationality. 
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Implications for Practice 
Finally, the present conception of rationality has signifi cant implications 
for enhancing human rationality. Most educators agree that the improvement 
of thinking should be a major goal of education (Siegel, 1988). The most sys-
tematic current efforts aimed at improving the thinking of students tend to in-
volve relatively direct inculcation of specifi c thinking skills (Adams, 1989; 
Baron & Sternberg, 1987). Good patterns of thinking, if well learned and ap-
plied, may indeed help students reach better conclusions and reject unfounded 
ideas, just as a better program may cause a computer to produce better out-
put. To the extent that the student lacks refl ective understanding of and inten-
tional control over his or her thinking skills, however, the student is no more 
rational than the computer (cf. Kuhn, 1991; Lehrer, 1990). Only to the extent 
that educational programs engage students in active refl ection on and recon-
struction of their own thinking are they fully enhancing rationality (Mosh-
man, 1990b, 1994). 
Similar considerations apply with respect to psychotherapy. Many theo-
rists and practitioners believe that psychological problems are often due to ir-
rational ideas and patterns of thought and can be relieved by eliminating such 
ideas and thought patterns (Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1977). But if we construe ra-
tionality as emerging from metasubjectivity, it is not enough simply to repro-
gram clients. Rather, the psychotherapist must assist them in refl ecting on 
their own thought processes so that changes in those processes will emerge 
out of such self-refl ection (Moshman & Hoover, 1989). 
Conclusion 
With respect to educational and psychotherapeutic practice, then, as for 
theory and research, a concern for good reasoning is appropriate. But ratio-
nality is served only when objective reasoning grows out of the subjective 
quest for reasons. It is our metasubjective objectivity that makes us creatures 
of reason. 
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